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PROJECT

CONVERSATIONS ON URBANIZATION: **TRANSCRIPT**

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ELIZABETH MORRISON: Good afternoon. I'm Elizabeth Morrison, Vice Dean of Faculty at Stern and a professor in the management department and I'm very pleased to be able to welcome all of you here today for the Conversation on Urbanization hosted by NYU Stern's Urbanization Project. We're very excited to have Commissioner William Bratton here with us today to have a Conversation with Paul Romer who is the founding director of the Urbanization Project, the director of the NYU Marron Institute and a member of our economics faculty here at Stern.

Among his many accomplishments, professor... I'm sorry, Commissioner Bratton has headed the NYPD as well as the LAPD. He is widely recognized for leading those organizations through successful turnarounds that

and thoughts related to urbanization. And with that, I turn you over to professor Paul Romer.

PAUL ROMER: Thanks. Thanks, Elizabeth. Well commissioner, it's a real treat to have you here. I'm a big proponent of startups as a way to sometimes move technology forward or even reform in societies. And I'm interested in startups mostly because I think turnarounds are just so difficult to pull off. And you're one of the few people I know who's serially pulled off successful turnarounds. I think you can count five different police organizations where you've done a full turnaround directly yourself.

And you're now engaged in consulting with a number of others. And maybe we'll be able to talk about some of those. But it's really a treat to have you here. Before we start, let me just give you the ground rules. We'll talk until about half past 5:00. Then... we will, as we get close to that time, we'll hand out some cards where you can write down questions and we'll take some Q&A from about 5:30 to 5:50. We'll quit right at 5:50 because some students I know have to get to 6 o'clock classes.

If there are members of the press who'd like to ask some questions, Commissioner Bratton is willing to stay around for about 10 minutes afterwards and take questions directly from the press. If you're on Twitter this evening, our handle is "nyusternup" for Urbanization Project and the hashtag is #romerbratton, I'm told. And finally,

let me just advertise that next week so this same time a week from now, we'll have a conversation about a startup history, a history of startups in New York City that will be led by Richard Florida and he'll be speaking with Fred Wilson from Union Square Ventures.

improved policing and lowered crime rates. He's written two books: "The Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic" and "Collaboration or Perish: Reaching Across Boundaries in a Networked World."

And I know that at least some of the students in the room are probably familiar with the Harvard Business School Case, "NYPD New," that was written about the turnaround effort here in New York City. Commissioner Bratton is currently the chief executive officer of the Bratton Group, an organization that provides collaborative consulting, leadership, management, and public safety networking services to both public and private sector entities in the U.S. and abroad.

And again, we're very pleased to have him here today to talk with us about some of his experiences and insights

So with that introduction, let me get you to help take us back for people who don't know the history. Tell us about what it felt like to think about crime, to think about policing when you first started as a patrol officer in Boston. And then also update us around the time when you took over the transit police or the, I guess it was called the transit police here in here in New York City. How did that feel like compared to how we perceive it now?

WILLIAM BRATTON: You're talking about a period of time, 1970 to 1990. 1970 when I joined the Boston Police Department, city I had grown up in, lifelong dream shaped

Picture 1: Elizabeth Morrison introduces Paul Romer and William Bratton.





significantly interestingly enough by television shows that I'd watched as a kid in Boston. Dragnet, Badge 714, Jack Webb, 1 Adam 12, Baker City. And the 1990 cut off is the year I came to New York City after 20 years in various police departments in Boston to take over the New York City transit police, at that time, a separate organization of 4,000 police officers policing in the subways and buses here in New York.

During that 20 years was a time of phenomenal change in policing, a time of evolution and indeed revolution. Coming into the business in 1970 was at the culmination or actually, continuation of the societal turbulence that had begun in the 1960's in our country. We were in the midst of an extraordinarily unpopular and costly war both in lives and economically, the Vietnam War. We were in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement led in many respects by Martin Luther King and many of his contemporaries.

We were in the midst of significant political change, the beginning with President Kennedy and the idea of a catholic being elected president of the country for the first time. We were in a time of great social turbulence, the Democratic National Convention Alliance, the Kent State shootings, an incredible time in American History, a time when for the first time, college students, like many of you were engaged in huge movements, whether it was the civil rights, anti-war, societal change.

In the middle of all of that, and often times a flashpoint for that, grievances against police, police behavior for many years, whether it was dealing with segregation laws or just dealing with the inefficiencies and in-competencies of the police. The police were in the middle of all of that. And coming out of the 60's into the 70's as those movements continued and the impact, society felt that the role of police needed to change. The role of police had always been based around the idea police exist to prevent crime by our presence, our behavior. Sir Robert Peel, the creation of the ward and Metropolitan Police in London.

And society believed coming out of the 60's that the role of police should change to response to crime that we should increase professionalization, our education levels, sophistication, forensics, training, and that society would try to figure out what it believed to be the causes of crime, basis in poverty, economic instability, demographics, a lot of young people.

That what police had focused on controlling behavior for many years, the idea was, we needed to professionalize,

but we also needed to change the way we police and we needed to focus on responding more efficiently to crime that has already occurred. That's the world I came into. I started in Boston, all 155 pounds of me with my six-shot revolver, my six spare rounds, no radio, set of handcuffs, and a pen, a parking ticket book, and six weeks of training and I was on the streets of Boston.

In the midst of all of this, I was very fortunate though, at that time, that as part of the professionalization of policing, the federal government for the first time was sponsoring and paying for college educations for police officers. Most American police chiefs, let alone police officers, did not have college educations. But beginning in the 70's, that there was a real push to expand our educational awareness.

Best thing that ever happened to me because I didn't get wrapped in the blue cocoon as I was beginning my career, walking in an all-black neighborhood that had been three years before an all-white Jewish neighborhood that had gone through real estate redlining. I was going to college at a time when the kids I'd be in the cafeteria with in the morning, in the afternoon with my blue suit on in front of the federal building as they were demonstrating against the war, demonstrating against racism. I get to interact with those, so I wasn't just dealing with police.

PAUL: By the way, let me just recommend the turnaround book is, I found, a fascinating book. And it tells some of this story because it gives your early years.

WILLIAM: It's really it's basically the policing world I came into. The 70's and 80's were a time of great change for police in that as ineffective as we had been in dealing with crime, particularly in the 60's, we became increasingly ineffective with dealing with the changing nature of crime in the 70's and 80's. That we had the compounding effects of increasing social disorder on the streets as police walking beats disappeared, became motorized, became more impersonal.

Communities didn't know the police; police didn't the communities. Instead of a foot beat which covered a small geographic area, you're now covering large geographic areas in your police car. You rarely had an assigned beat. 911 came into being and that was all about speeding up response to calls wherever they came from. So I might start off assigned in Sector 3-1 and never spend any of my time in my assigned sector because I was chasing 911 calls. We were always going after the fact. We were always responding. Investigations were after the fact. Police were after the fact.



It was hoped by our presence running around from 911 call to 911 call that would deter crime, but we really wouldn't. And with the de-policing of the streets, we were also dealing with de-institutionalization. Hundreds of thousands of people from mental institutions that were awful in the 60's and 70's, well intended. They were returned to their neighborhoods, supposedly to neighborhood treatment centers, most of which weren't built, to self-care with their families, most of which they never rejoined and never did self-medicate. So we had the beginning in the streets of a large population joining.

There had been a large population on skid row for years. But now people with significant mental, emotional issues who were not being treated in any appropriate form. And we had what came to be known inappropriately the homeless population who indeed were homeless in many instances, but they were a population with emotional instability, also now beginning to mix with another population that was basically dealing with drug addiction, which was growing rapidly in the 70's and 80's.

So you had traditional inner city blight exacerbated by the idea of a huge growth of population of people whose behavior was making cities seemingly less safe, feeling less safe, and fewer police. And police who had many fewer tools or laws to work with. Drunkenness was no longer a crime. Drunkenness was deemed to be an illness. So the tools by which police could deal with that used to be arrest. Judges could then incarcerate, hopefully get people off the streets in the middle of winter. You no longer had that tool.

There were alcoholism centers, most of which were planned and most of which were never built. So police found themselves increasingly with no ability to deal with these populations. In the 80's, it was compounded by the fact that the size of police forces in most cities around the country began to shrink. And then in the 80's, we had the compounding issue of the growth of drugs, the multiplicity of drugs, particularly cocaine, cocaine and heroine, but cocaine in the early 80's was in powdered form that became socially acceptable in many parts of America where drugs had always been not accepted, middle class, upper class.

It was a safe drug to use. You could snort it during the weekend and go back to work, wasn't deemed to be habit forming. It wasn't until a few years later, we found out just how habit forming it could be and what the societal effects would be. And then the problem with cocaine was the many derivatives, free-basing. And then 1985, the

explosion of crack cocaine, which destroyed city after city beginning here in New York. It literally went like a plague through this city, compounding the lives of many thousands of people.

Coupled with it was increasing efforts by drug dealers and armies of young people to take control of it, to profit from it. And increasingly because of the liberal gun laws in our country, for the period of 1980's, that criminal population fighting over control of drugs was better armed than police in most American cities. New York transit police did not get 9 millimeter fire arms until 1991. The city did not get them until 1993. The criminals had them as early as 1980's.

So by 1990, we had a time of increasing professionalization of the police, better training, better recruiting, better recruitment, but a focus on responding to crime. You can expect what you inspect. And we were being measured not by our ability to prevent crimes, Sir Robert Peel, but by our response. So there was really no focus on trying to

Picture 2: William Bratton (right) speaks with Paul Romer (left) about changes in policing between 1970 and 1990.



stop crime except by the residual benefit of getting to the scene of the crime, investigating it, making an arrest and after the fact, putting somebody in jail.

PAUL: So we'll take the next step in that story.

WILLIAM: It's up to 1990.



PAUL: So we'll talk about the turn around in a second. But I think that one thing that's worth reminding people of is, is that you can still see signs of this around-around New York. If you're interested in just remembering this the turbulence coming out of the riots and the protest movements, go find the house that blew up as Weatherman Bomb Factory, which is just a few blocks from-from here and you can still recognize that-that townhouse. So college students of that era, some of them were building bombs to go bomb, you know, the city or the police. The other story that John Sexton likes to tell is of One Fifth Avenue, which is this very large apartment building just off the park that used to be owned by the university.

And at a time of fiscal distress, the city had to sell that building and that entire building sold for 2 million dollars. Right now, I'm not sure you can get an apartment in that building for 2 million dollars. But the difference in value is a sign of how bad the perceptions were of the problems of crime at that time and.

WILLIAM: Well most of you were too young looking at this population to understand what this area looked like in 1990, what that park across the street was like. The graffiti, the decay, the crime and social disorder. The New Yorker Magazine cartoons of that era were very significantly focused on crime. It was one of my favorites that "High Crime Area, Run." Well that could have posted that sign all around the area that you now go to school and because that's what was going on here.

And this school, Columbia and many others going into the late 80's/early 90's were having a hard time recruiting into the school. You know what you went through to get accepted here. Well back then, parents would come and take a look at this place and say, "No way am I going to spend \$20,000." Back in the good old days when it was about \$20,000 for tuition to send my kid here and risk them being raped or burglarized, because that was the significant risk. And the subway system had become symbolic of the decay. All 6,000 subway cars covered with graffiti inside and out.

Most turnstile arrays vandalized by vandals who purposely vandalized them so they then stand at the slam gate and demand you up back in the good old days when it was a token and not the Metro pass cards. They were the subway version of the street version of the extortionists, the squeegee pests. There's only 12 ways to get on the island of Manhattan by car. And to get onto the island, these were great marketers. It was only about 100 of them. But they were at those 12 entrances. And as you

stopped at the red light, they would come up and demand to wash your window with their filthy rag and their bottle of water and very intimidating experience.

And they used to joke that at that era, they should have taken the torch out of the Statue of Liberty's hand and put a squeegee there because there was more a welcoming sign to the city of New York. The city is societal freefall.

PAUL: Yeah. One of the things that I found fascinating, I think that I got from the book was how few squeegee people there were that the whole city...

WILLIAM: Like I said, they're marketers.

PAUL: Yeah. Well the city seemed paralyzed and terrified by what turned out to be a very small population. And when a little bit of policing effort was applied, apparently, they just problem went away.

WILLIAM: What had gone on in the 70's and 80's was the police were not expected to do anything about these quality of life types of issues: aggressive begging, encampments in every park. Washington, the park right across the street, had large numbers of people living in the park. I still remember the park adjacent to the United Nations had, when I came in as police commissioner, almost 300 people living in that park.

The homeless population as they have become known were basically street people by and large with severe emotional, drug, or alcoholism problems, would not go into the public shelters and New York had one of the largest public shelter systems and as problematic as that system was that they would not go into it because basically they would some type of controlled environment. I mean the street people did not want to be in an environment where they could not get access to the drugs or with their.

The ones I feel particularly badly for are emotionally disturbed with schizophrenia. That confinement just did not work for them either. But the city was a mess. It was going on Boston and other places. But the police in the 70's and 80's had not been expected to deal with that. It was basically leave it alone. We want you to focus on serious crime. What we did not recognize was that serious crime, certainly there were victims. And you could satisfy yourself that you were saving victims of crime and focusing on serious crime.

It really didn't come to understand until the late 80's and early 90's that there were victims of the societal crime



on all this abhorrent behavior on the streets. And the victim was the neighborhood itself, was the city itself. Neighborhoods that went into steep decline because there was not any attention to street prostitution, street narcotics dealing, abandoned cars, graffiti, the sense that society, government was not focused on public safety, and we were not. We were focused on traditional serious crime.

We came to... it would be like a doctor who's only going to deal with the serious illness you're dealing with, but is not going to treat other symptomatic crime, if left untreated, eventually is going to be as threatening as the serious crime. So like a doctor beginning in the 1990's, it was a new movement of policing was born. I was privileged to be part of the leadership of it based on my experiences in Boston in the 70's and 80's. But the professional model was essential. We need a better educated police. We needed better systems, better technology.

But what community policing, the new model, brought to the stage was 1, a focus on partnership that police cannot effectively police any city, any community unless we partner with the community, partner with other law enforcement and city agencies; 2, identify what are the problems that are creating fear, creating disorder, and ultimately creating crime. And with limited resources, what do you want us to prioritize on. What do we need to focus our time on?

And also, the concept of something I've always embraced in a police department of decentralization, empowering a local precinct commander to work with his or her community because the city the size of New York, you can't expect the police commissioner to be aware of what's going on down on West 3rd Street all the time. But the precinct commander here through involvement with community should be aware of deteriorating conditions in that area and be able to address it.

And key element of community policing and the old adage, everything old is new again. The key in those prominent aspect of community policing, the reason for success is its focus once again on the prevention of crime. In policing, we came once again and political leadership at the city level, state level, and national level. Bill Clinton's COPS program, a community policing program. The ultimate partnership: federal, state, and local committed to partnering up to do something about crime that focused on prevention.

Going back to expression, "You can expect what you inspect." If you're inspecting for prevention, it puts into play a whole different set of management priorities

Picture 3: William Bratton (right) explains models of community policing.



and focus than if you're expecting for response. So the inspecting for prevention, the belief that police can do something about the cause of crime. And what is the cause of crime? It isn't racism, poverty, demographics, economy, the weather. They can be phenomenal influences if left unaddressed. But they in and of themselves are not the cause of crime.

The ultimate cause of crime is the individual who, a criminal, intentionally commits a crime, the individual, the emotionally disturbed, the drug addict, the alcoholic with a moment of uncontrolled behavior commits a crime, an offense on a moment of passion or a moment of even ignorance. You know you're not supposed to park here. You're not supposed to do this or that. In our democratic society, the number one obligation of government is referenced by the Constitution; Declaration of Independence is public safety.

And the criminal justice system is the entity that is charged with that. But most significantly, in that criminal justice system are the police who are charged with through their behavior. Sir Robert Peel, "The Nine Principles of Policing." By their behavior, to they're entrusted to enforce the law, to control behavior. The challenge is to do it constitutionally. You have to do it within the parameters of the law. You can't break the law. And in the 40's/50's/60's, police were breaking the law quite a lot. So that's why we ended up with a lot of constitutional guidelines.

Rolando, Escobedo, Terry versus Ohio, Star question of Frisk, exclusionary rules to basically put parameters around the police behavior. The other element of it is to



do it respectfully. That if you're trying to control the cause of crime, which is behavior, that as you try to control it to the extent you change it, you can achieve more if it's done respectfully. On occasion, requires force which we're authorized to use. But the force has to be responsive to the threat.

And the last element of it is it has to be done compassionately or consistently, that you cannot police differently in Harlem than you're policing down here around the environment of NYU. That the same laws apply, the same procedures. Certain areas at certain times may have more significant crime problems that require more police presence, more assertiveness, but that's the idea of balancing it. But what changed was in the 90's and I'm one of the principal advocates of it, is that the role of police is to first [and foremost to] prevent crime. There's not one of you in this room who would not prefer not to be the victim of a rape, a robbery, a burglary, and then take satisfaction, because the police arrested your assailant. You'd much prefer to not have had to go through that experience in the first place. And one of the benefits of that control the behavior to such an extent as you change it is what this city is experiencing right now. Crime that has gone down for 20-some-odd straight years, 80 percent less than it was. And the worst crime year in the history of this city, 1990, when I came to New York to take over the transit police, 700,000 reported major crimes: rapes, robberies, murders, car thefts.

But then a city that was in total chaos around quality of life issues, the graffiti, the street prostitution, the decay. And the idea being that in the subway system that most of you ride, every day in 1990 250,000 people a day went into that system and didn't pay the fare; an \$80 million loss of revenue to the Transit System, money that could be used for better trains, better service, station upkeep. And until we devise methods to control that behavior, so that they pay their fare it meant making sure that we were arresting the vandals vandalizing the turnstiles so you could pay the fare, and not have to give it somebody standing at the slam gate.

But also understanding that whether you worked on Wall Street or you're working up in Harlem or over in East New York, everybody was required to pay the fare. And that Malcolm Gladwell wrote a wonderful article in New Yorker Magazine, subsequently turned into his book *Tipping Point*, in which the inspiration for that was riding the subway in New York, seeing how from 1990 to 1991 fare evasion went away. And he was fascinated, "What happened with it?" the vandals went away, the graffiti was

removed off the train cars, and he wrote about the idea that crime, the signs of crime like an epidemic, a medical epidemic can grow exponentially.

And that's what happened in New York and many other cities in the '70s and '80s. But that you can tip it as quickly, if you can find the right medicine, the right vaccine that you can just as quickly tip it. And so the inspiration for that bestselling book was the transit subway experience during the time I was Chief of Police. I have an autographed book from Malcolm I'm quite proud of, "Thank you for the inspiration." And...

PAUL: So, let me just drill on this, because I think this history is important to remember, partly because there's some possibility that it could come back, or that that history could play itself out in other parts of the world. You know, we see lots of countries and cities say even in Europe where for example they haven't figured out how to control the graffiti on the subway trains. So, what do you think is the risk that we could eventually go through a repeat of the kind of restrictions on policing, and then a return to...?

WILLIAM: Two part response to the question. One, America, and two, the comment you made about other parts of the world. We're fortunate that we've got the oldest democracy in the world and arguably the most successful. A lot of lessons to be learned from us, good and bad. And so as these Emerging Democracies you and I have both spent a lot of time in Latin America, in particular, where their Emerging Democracy's incredibly stressed, and usually stressed very significantly around the obligation of public safety, which most of them unfortunately don't have. They have incredibly corrupt, brutal police departments. They have incredibly corrupt governments.

And so, a lot of the head start that we have in the United States that's emerged over the last couple of hundred years of government that is by enlarge corruption free, not to say we don't have it. Right not we can't effectively say we have much competency in government, look at what's going on in Washington, but it's democracy in action, that the essentially element as I advise down there, as I speak down there, and I'm very open about it, until you get some ability to pay your police so that they don't have to extort everybody every time they encounter them, that you're never going to have a secure democracy.

That whether it's a democracy in name only or the actual principle.



PAUL: Actually, the reason we're focusing on crime in this session today, but also in much of our work in the Urbanization Project is that crime is the most important,

any country to judge the quality of the policing and the interaction with the public, which is ask a parent, 'What would you tell your child to, who would you tell your child to call if they're alone at home and something bad happens.' And if they parents tell the children, 'Call the police,' then you're in a good situation. If they tell the child, you know, 'Don't call the police, call your uncle or call your friends,' then you've got a very much worse example."

Picture 4: Students, faculty, visitors, and press listen closely to the conversation.



the essential function that a government has to address, or public safety is the service it has to provide. And no city will succeed if it doesn't do that basic task. And it is a challenge that generally falls to the city government rather than something like the national government.

WILLIAM: We speak to that. But first to comment, I have, those of you who practice yoga, I have a mantra, "Cops count, police matter." And it's the belief that, the point you're making, that cops are essential to any city, any state, our national government's success in assuring all that democracy promises. The pillars of democracy: education, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, all of those are on a shaky foundation if the public safety is not secure.

What our African-American citizens endured and continue in some respects to still endure because of lack of public safety, the segregation laws, the Jim Crowe laws, continuing efforts to deny them the vote, all of that foundation of public safety, if an Africa-American or a recent immigrant or a citizen can't feel secure walking into a police station or up to a police officer to report an incident or a crime, because of fear that because of their color or their language difficulty that they're not going to be treated well, then everything else that we promise is on shaky foundation. And we don't live in a perfect society. But traveling around the world we're pretty good at it compared to most other places.

PAUL: You know, we had a meeting of police chiefs here organized by your friend Bob Wasserman, and somebody there said, "There's a very good question you could ask in

police are so mistrusted, you don't want to bring them into your home, because they could see what you have for alarm systems and property. So, that the private security business is a huge business in that Emerging Democracy, which all the promise of that democracy and what is an [environly] extraordinarily rich country, is still impacted by the failure of government and the police to deliver public safety, basic public safety to huge parts of the population.

I'm an unabashed advocate of the profession I've spent my life in or associated with the police profession, and its importance in our society. I'm very cognoscente of its limitations, its abuses over time, and its potential negative impact. But I'm not shy also about the importance of police to our society, our form of government, and the security that a city I live in, choose to live in, choose to return to from my time in Los Angeles, and my birthplace of Boston, because this is a city I feel very comfortable traveling around in, subways, streets, walking.

And in 1990, I went nowhere without a gun, as the Chief of Transit Police, because I did not feel secure anywhere, including in the subways. And I don't carry one now, I haven't seen it for a while, it's locked away. And I just don't feel the need for it. And I like that that I can do that. In Los Angeles, when I was Chief of Police there, I had to carry a gun everywhere. And, because of the gang violence, and the concerns of violence that was still there in that city, although fortunately that's a corner that's been turned significantly in the last several years.

PAUL: So, part of this story is governments that need to build both the legitimacy and the capacity to provide



public safety, so there's a kind of development process, and they're at various stages along that process, but the other worrisome trend or pattern is where you have a society like the United States coming out of the '50s, or I think like you can see in some European countries, where they had been doing a good job of providing public safety, and then actually things start to get worse, crime gets much worse.

WILLIAM: What's interesting about that, using the period of time the 1950s, the Eisenhower year, the Leave it to Beaver era. I grew up as a young kid, I could go out every Saturday morning with my nickel, half of my allowance for the week, with my friend Franny McNulty, wrote about him in the book, and what we did on Saturdays at age of 10 was that we would go and ride the subways and buses in the greater Boston area for the whole day. Our parents didn't worry about us traveling all over through all parts of the inner city, that I defy anybody in this city to put a 10 year old that as safe as things are now versus what they were, there's still a higher degree of worry than there was certainly during my era.

But during the era, police were incompetent, they were brutal, they were inefficient, and they were incredibly corrupt; agency, not just individual, including in this city, including in my city. When I joined the Boston Police Department it still had many of those vestiges in 1970. So, what changed in our society I think going into the '60s was that the pressure cooker for which police had kept the lid on, segregation law in the South where they were the law, or de facto law here in the North, dealing with our African-American, people of color.

The idea of corruption, police were very poorly paid, so effectively found other ways to subsidize their income, that all that basically exploded in the '60s going back to my earlier comment, that when you look at so many of the disturbances in the '60s, the Race Riots, the Anti-War Movement, often times the flashpoint was a police action, and even going into the 1990s in Los Angeles, a police action precipitating that pent-up frustration with being treated unfairly by the police who are the most visible part of government.

So, the 1950s were, sure they were safe, but in many respects police weren't reporting crime accurately, and that what has changed is the professionalization that society demanded we begin to bring into place in the '70s.

PAUL: But it seems like we may have gone through a dynamic where there was a time of police that were

powerful, but were out of control, or at least not accountable, and therefore engaged in some of these bad things.

WILLIAM: They were, all you have to do is see the movie *Serpico*, that a lot of it which was filmed down in this area. That was the policing in New York City in the 1960s, that was the reality of it. No getting around it.

PAUL: And so when we brought in the controls that limited some of those abuses appropriately, it seems as if we almost went too far in the sense that we basically made it impossible for the police to actually do anything to prevent crime, and also kind of promulgated a vision that their job wasn't to try and prevent crime.

WILLIAM: Actually, it wasn't the controls I think in the '70s and '80s, it was the erroneous belief that police could not do anything about what society had come to believe were the causes of crime. Well intended on the part of society, and they wanted to rectify it, but they did not do a particularly good job in the '70s and '80s, they ran out of moneys for a lot of the societal efforts to improve housing, improve education, improve healthcare, take care of those half a million mentally ill who were released from the institutions, deal with the increasing number of young people coming out of single parent or no parent homes that were impacted by drugs that the police were focused in the wrong direction with the wrong strategies.

And that we were effectively excused from taking any responsibility for the growth of crime; society was accepting that responsibility, and ironically, police more so than even the political leadership, the academic leadership, the researchers started, and I can speak to this because this was me, in 1990, 1989, really said, as one of the first police chief in the country to say, "We can do something about crime," as I think I was certainly the first chief probably in America in the '90s, that set numerical goals for crime reduction.

PAUL: Yeah, so describe that project of turnaround within the force first, and then in the broader, you know, city culture, changing this view that the police can't accomplish anything. When was it when you made that numerical commitment about the 10 percent reduction? Was that when you took over as commission or as the subway?

WILLIAM: Well, in the subways, because things were so bad that as we looked at it, and as I felt comfortable we



could focus those 4,000 cops, think of that 4,000 cops just policing the subways, not an army, that understandably it was a big subway system, but by focusing them on doing something about crime, developing strategies and initiatives, that I felt very comfortable, much as a doctor treating you with antibiotics when you come in, that I could get crime down, that would accomplish two things, three things actually. One, reduce the number of victims. But inspired the department to feel that, “Geez, if we do it this way, isn’t it great to have crime going down instead of going up?”

And then for the public, the media and government to start feeling better about the city. What is one of the things that you know apart from the controversy over the last year or so around “Stop, question, frisk,” that this city celebrates. You know, it is truly one of the safest large cities in America, attracts 55 million tourists a year, where back in 1995 we were attracting 25 million and declining, because the city was felt to be so unsafe, and those 55 million tourists have translated into all these hotels that you see. Brooklyn, the Manhattanization of Brooklyn that everybody is bemoaning.

My police headquarters was in Brooklyn, over by the government center, and the park next to the police headquarters, transit headquarters, Marriot Hotel was talking about building the first hotel in Brooklyn in something like 50 years, and people thought they were crazy, “Who’s gonna stay in Brooklyn? What are you crazy? Brooklyn, the crime capital of America?” That it’s not so much the crime in Manhattan, it was the crime in Brooklyn. Now look at the reenergizing of Brooklyn that, there’s a comment in this morning’s paper about the mayoral candidate Mr. de Blasio got two [row houses] in a city, they probably bought for a very small amount of money years ago, that are now worth in excess of a million dollars each as the area has improved.

And I was privileged to be part of a lot of that turnaround that the 7-5 precinct in East New York, it had the unfortunate nickname of the Killing Fields. Because in 1990 it had I think the number was 125 or 150 murders in that one relatively small precinct. This past year, it’s unfortunate it still is one of the leading precincts for crime in the city. But the amount of it that I think the homicide count, and you can’t hold me to exact figures, I think less than two dozen, still a horrific number for the people who live there.

But two dozen versus 150. And the idea that Magic Johnson went and built a multiplex cinema, the first grocery store

that had been built in years was able to open there. So that it all is I believe about public safety, but the challenge that has to be met is in doing it in a way that unlike the ‘40s, ‘50s, and ‘60s was brutal, corrupt, racist, is that it is constitutionally guided and shaped, that is in fact done in partnership, community policing, with the community, is done in a way in which there’s an expression that’s very much in vogue in policing today called “Legitimacy.”

That it is being done legally, and that procedural justice, the idea that people are, as they are exposed to the justice system, that it is done appropriately, that the procedures are not biased or set against them. And so that’s the challenge.

PAUL: But back in trying to change this belief and convince people it was possible, say and that public commitment you made, that “I think crime’s gonna go down by 10 percent in one year,” were you thinking first of persuading your...?

WILLIAM: Well, it actually got better than that during the... the success in the subways in the city of New York, David Dinkins had been elected mayor in I think 1990, the first African-American mayor, and within a short period of time the residual effects of the crime built up in the ‘80s in his first six months were still being felt. And there was a famous headline, “Do something, Dave” in the New York Post, I think. And the mayor did what everybody thought was impossible. He was able to get a tax measure through in Albany that called for the hiring of 6,000 additional police officers, bringing the department strength from 25,000 up to 31,000.

Picture 5: William Bratton discusses strategies for reducing crime rates.



And it was gonna be built around the idea of “the beat cop is back,” that was the name of the program. And remember I talked about, I started my career as a beat cop, people in the neighborhood, although they were all black and I



was white, knew me and I knew them, that the idea was to bring a personal form of policing back to the streets of New York, that there'd be a beat cop. And so the Dinkins Administration got the funding through to hire the 6,000 cops, but it was not making a significant difference in the appearance of the city or in the numbers; crime was going down 1, 2, 3 percent.

So, the mayor can take credit for the expansion of the police force and the beginning of the crime decline, but the tipping point as Gladwell would talk about it occurred later in the decade, and when Giuliani won the election, that largely around the issue that crime still seemed to be out of control, the issues on the street, the crime numbers, that they were still so large, that crime in the subways during my two years, '90, '91, went down by over 25 percent. Before I got there Bob Kiley, the head of the transit system already cleaned up the subway cars, but then we went after the vandals, fixed the vandalism, started dealing with the street people who were attempting to live in the subways.

5,000 people living in the subways in 1990. And then my first year I think there was about 150 to 175 that died in the subway, freezing to death, run over by trains, electrocuted, murdered, and that so the subways were not for sleeping. And so we found ways to deal with that population that was basically at great risk in the subway system. Subways aren't designed to be a place that you could spend all your time. And some of these poor souls were in the bowels of the subways, not on the platforms or the subway cars, but in those tunnels.

I had a 50 squad unit, all volunteers, who every night would go into those tunnels to just find these people to get them out of the tunnels before they froze to death, run over by trains or electrocuted. So, that we got crime down, we moved a lot of the quality of life type offenses, like fare evasion, by 25 percent. Giuliani, aware of that, and the reason he approached me to be his first police commissioner was, "Can you do the same things in the streets?" I said, "Certainly." And I said, "I'll get crime down by 40 percent in three years."

When I left after 27 months, he and I had a parting of the ways that was very publically reported and I wrote about in the book, crime was down 39 percent. So, we had effectively begun the turnaround. There were consequences, however, and I speak to in the book, one of my frustrations and something that still haunts him and his administration was that during that time racial tensions instead of improving as crime went down dramatically actually increased.

And then, several years later in the late-1990s, there was a series of events in a very short period of time, horrific incidents involving police and the minority community. There was Abner Louima, the sodomization in the police precinct, there was Amadou Diallo, shot 41 times by a street crime unit, and Patrick Dorsman [PH] approached by a narcotics squad, who ended up in an encounter with them, and also ended up being shot to death. And it just, at a time when the city was in fact getting better with reduced crime, there was increased tension, and some of that continues to this day.

As evidenced by the controversy during the current election process around particularly "stop, question, and frisk."

PAUL: Let's talk, looking forward a little bit, about the role for technology. Do you think that things like the wearable cameras may actually throw out a way to get a better balance between cultivating legitimacy of the force, but still doing the job?

WILLIAM: Well, the great frustrations in policing for our police chiefs is that, it's like a kid at Christmas with his nose pressed against the glass looking at all the wonderful toys behind the window and, "Boy I wish I could have all of those." And you can only, you know, luckily you might get one or two. And the technology that's available to police today to assist in that, well, what's basically, I helped to create while I was still in the Los Angeles Police Department, predictive policing.

We now have the ability through the gathering of information and the algorithms being developed by a number of the universities to comfortably predict that within a certain timeframe, within a certain geographic area, absent putting an intersession in there, mainly a police officer, that you're gonna have a crime there. And it's being experimented with significantly by the LAPD, but it's a term you're gonna hear a lot more of, but predictive policing is based on having the computer abilities, the intelligence analysis capabilities, the technology, the real time crime centers. They all cost money. And we're in a time of great stress for monies as well know.

New York benefits ironically from the tragedy of 9-11 that it had tremendous amounts of money to invest in those technologies, but with technology also comes concerns. It's the same as we have police tactics on the street, concerns about the interaction of the police with the public, "stop, question, frisk," etcetera, similarly the other issue of concern at the moment, not just New York, it's nationally, the Snowden revelations, NSA, the necessity



to gather information to predict that there's gonna be a terrorist attack so you can prevent it.

Because isn't that what policing, isn't that what terrorism's all about to prevent it before it happens? And the idea that we don't want to have another 9-11, because when you look back, all the studies that have been done about it, it could've been prevented because the information and the intelligence was there, but it was not shared. And so, the lesson learned there was there has to be collaboration, and I write about that extensively in my book *Collaborate or Perish*, that what is so necessary is collaboration with community, police, federal agencies, to deal not only with terrorism but to deal with traditional crime. And how does that work that of the attempted terrorists plots in this country that have been detected since 9-11 the majority have been home-inspired, or home-initiated.

Maybe inspired occasionally from Al-Qaeda or others

Picture 6: William Bratton discusses current projects in Detroit and Baltimore.



external, but 75 percent of those that have been detected have been detected because of a collaboration between a community member who has informed a police officer or a police officer who because of relationships with the community we're able to put the clues together to predict that something was going to happen and to be able to prevent it.

So, the collaboration which is so essential to successful policing really requires a trust between community and police that what we're doing is in fact not illegal, not race or ethnic biased or in the case of the terrorism issue, in terms of the Muslim community about being unfairly targeted by the police or the federal government in those investigations, and so that's where all the elements, the learning experiences of the last numbers of years that

the strength of community policing is, it is proactive, assertive policing, but it also recognizes that if you don't have the empowerment of a legitimacy, the trust of the community, you're not gonna have the information that's coming to you willingly that allows you to really predict and prevent crimes from occurring.

PAUL: Before we open it up for questions, do you want to talk a little bit about some of the work you've been doing in other communities, Detroit in particular?

WILLIAM: Oh, sure.

PAUL: Or other places where there's the same potential for the kind of turnaround we've seen here.

WILLIAM: While I'm no longer in policing, I throughout my life have stayed involved with policing, so at the moment my company and my colleagues are working with other companies, my company is the lead agency, we're currently working on projects in the city of Baltimore, working the new police chief and the mayor in Baltimore on attempting to design plans of actions and crime initiatives to deal with that city's very significant crime problems around the issue of drugs and shootings in particular.

We're working in Detroit with the newly appointed Police Chief and working for the Emergency Manager that has taken over the governance of Detroit.

PAUL: And Chief Craig worked for you in L.A.?

WILLIAM: Chief Craig worked for me in Los Angeles as one of my captains and is somebody I've been involved with for a number of years. And we're there working to create the chief's vision, and it's through a plan of action, and the acquisition of a lot of technology to assist that city's efforts. We recently worked in Oakland, just finished a project there to reconfigure the structure of the police department, develop crime strategies to deal with their shootings, robberies, and home invasion problems.

I'm very optimistic about Detroit, optimistic about Baltimore; Oakland has a whole series of issues that independent of its crime problem, the result of a lot of leadership issues, federal oversight, it is the most overseen police department in America, and sometimes there's too many cooks in the kitchen. And Oakland is really



struggling to get its arms around its crime problem. In some instances, due to there's just so much oversight that it's difficult to move anything forward quickly. Detroit I have great hope...

That far, because the chief there has phenomenal powers for the time being, they're gonna move very quickly. And there's a lot of desire and effort to put resources, the president was just there last week. 300 million dollars they're gonna pour into there, and a variety of efforts. Technology, additional police officers. In Baltimore there's a... the new mayor down there that is really committed to the idea of, she's not gonna engage in practices of dragnet, global, lock up everybody, she wants focused policing on those that are committing the shootings and the murders, and it'll take a while to develop those plans, the technology.

They've got over 100 some odd diverse computer systems, none of which talk to each other. And so it's an organization that really needs to come into the 21st century to take advantage of the 21st century. But there's a lot of hope and promise in that city also.

PAUL: Yep. So as you know, some of us at NYU are also engaged in trying to advise and work with the emergency manager in Detroit, and I think it's gonna be a fascinating test case of this assertion we started out with, that policing is the most important function of the city government, and the...

WILLIAM: The emergency manager and the governor in that state clearly believe that, that the limited resources, they gotta prioritize putting it into the police department, as long as they have comfort that the police department can be led and organized in a way that will show effect, and I'm very comfortable that will happen.

PAUL: Yeah. If they can make Detroit safe, everybody's pointed to this huge decline in its population within the city proper. If they can make that a safe place to live, they can turn around that population decline, and there's lots of room for people to move back into it.

WILLIAM: It will appear to turn it around to get it back to, let's face it, a city with 700,000 people is never gonna have two and a half million people again. It's just, it's not going to happen, the jobs are not there to support people effectively moving there. But it can stabilize, it can get its image off the front page of America's most failed city, to one that is in fact coming back. The three cities of reference that Baltimore similarly has a significant amount of distressed housing area because its population

decline. You see less of that in Oakland, Oakland's a very small, compact city, there's really not a lot of vacant property in Oakland.

Ironically here in New York and Los Angeles both, there's almost no large swaths of vacant buildings that, in Philadelphia, Baltimore, certain other cities, you can ride for block after block, and it's just boarded up housing. You don't see that in LA or New York because the, the population is growing. Eight and a half million, in 1990 when I came here it was seven and a half million, and people polled at that time, more than 60 percent of the population, if they could would've left New York, in 1990. Most recent poll I think was something on the order of about 15 to 20 percent, but the city now is a million more people, it's growing, and it's... as a result is kind of bursting at the seams.

And the challenge for the next mayor as it has been for the current mayor is finding affordable housing, building affordable housing, and that's a challenge that's faced every mayor in the city since I started coming here in 1990, to have enough affordable housing to handle the people that are coming. LA has got a very similar situation.

PAUL: Yep. Well I may be even more of the optimist than you, but I actually think that...

WILLIAM: You'd have to try hard, I try to be very much the optimist.

PAUL: But, I think in Detroit, right now, the land has negative value, if you look at the price of a structure, and the land together, they're actually worth less than it costs to build the structure. That people are putting a negative value on the land. And one of the few things that can make people view land as so worthless that it's worth less than zero to them, is that it's a dangerous place to be, you'd have to be paid to go live on that land, but if they...

WILLIAM: Well it goes back, back to my point about, my wife says I should've been born as the baron of beautification, because I pay attention to things that most people do not, and one of the things I pay attention to is street furniture. The idea of street lights, benches, trash cans. Cleanliness issues. In 1990 when I came to New York, there were urban oases in the middle of Manhattan. Most of Manhattan's street lighting are those horrific orange street lights. Just they give this awful ominous glow, and there, one of the things about New York, it's a very poorly lighted city.



You go to Chicago, Chicago has four times per, number of street lights per block than New York. Chicago also has white light, and white light is the light that we're now going to with the changing of the bulb situation. But in New York, you could come into Manhattan at night, and you would find these oases of peace and tranquility. And they were the business improvement districts at Grand Central, at Bryant Park, another one up along Park Avenue. And what they had done, they changed the street lights, the street lights were a totally different style of light.

They were consistent, they were brighter. The light was white instead of the yellow. And it gives a softer glow. But the streets were clean, they had people cleaning them all the time. All the street furniture was new, and they had security officers, so they were taking care of the cleanliness, they were taking care of functionality, and they were taking care of safety. And they were, I would ide you, they were the seeds of rebirth of New York City. As the rebirth of New York City began in Manhattan, and then spread to the outer boroughs, and probably the Bronx and Brooklyn arguably the most significant beneficiaries of it.

The Bronx in the '80s looked like Europe after World War II, many areas of it. And Brooklyn, the crime rates there were just absolutely phenomenal. And so that, when I speak about the appearance of things, that it really does make a difference. You go into a neighborhood that's covered with graffiti, abandoned cars, you just don't feel safe, you feel... I know a lot of young people like a little edgier environment that, opposed to when you're my age, you like a comfortable environment. I believe when I was in my 20s, I liked a little, a comfortable environment also.

And the idea that, that also is relative to the behavior of people. You can have street people, you can have street musicians, you can have street entertainers. You can even have certain forms of graffiti, or certain locations where it's approved, and not on every public building, inside of every subway car. But if it's done in an environment where you feel safe, you can enjoy it more. If you're not feeling that you're gonna get robbed, or besieged at every moment. And that's the challenge to find that, where there can be freedom of expression, but also in a democracy we all have to give up something for the common good.

And some of what we give up is the freedom to do whatever we want. Case in point, what you're seeing in so much of the news, the last couple days, that horrific incident involving a young family surrounded by the 200 bikers. And the idea of the tragedy that turned into. But that's

what I'm talking about, that fear induced thing that you have 200 individuals who feel that they're going to break out of the norms that are expected in our society, shut down a highway. A major highway on a Sunday afternoon, so they can race their bikes up and down and do their wheelies, and the tragedy that resulted when a gentleman coming down the highway wanted to use the highway, which he was entitled to do.

But you have this group saying I'm sorry, but we're gonna do our thing for a while. You cannot have that. You cannot have it, because that's anarchy. That's not democracy.

PAUL: You know this reminds me, that one of the most striking things for me in Greece, was when I saw the public demonstrations, which were then followed by the anarchal hooligans, who were like throwing the fire

Picture 7: William Bratton explains the difficult balance between freedom of expression and the expectations of a safe society.



bombs at the police. And the police in Greece were trying not to get burnt alive, but otherwise wouldn't ,wouldn't stop, they would, in a sense tolerate this violence by the protestors, and demonstrators. And you could see how too much tolerance of just, you know...

WILLIAM: Well that's what the idea, and that's...

PAUL: Belligerent behavior can really start to...

WILLIAM: Democracy, the police are in power the only people in power which use force to effectuate control. But it has to be the appropriate level of force to the situation. And so, you don't see, in this country use of water cannons, police dogs any longer. This has been deemed by our society that those are inappropriate. You see very little use of tear gas also. That, it's come to be accepted that that can't be accepted levels of response to demonstrations.



PAUL: Yep, yep. But on the other hand, we also wouldn't tolerate, on an ongoing basis, people throwing fire bombs at police. Just, whatever we had to do, we would, we would stop that.

WILLIAM: I'm gonna put you back on time, because you have quite a list of questions there, so...

PAUL: Yeah. Well let's go with one of those. Someone, a second here... Why is there more militarization of the police, in a period when we actually have a very low rate of crime?

WILLIAM: I think the Navy yard. I think Newtown. Just think the front pages of the paper every day in this country, that we are insane about our love of guns, and that I talked about how police were, in the 1980s, outgunned literally by the criminals. That we ended up in an arms escalation. A lot of the militarization of police is to focus on both officer safety, so as we expect officers to go in harms way as they did in the Navy yard. Or to take on individuals who are equipped with incredible range of weaponry.

What just happened in Nairobi can happen any day in this country. And we've seen smaller examples of it. So the militarization if you will, that term, the better arming of police, unfortunately is necessary to deal with the societal issues that may occur here. After Mumbai, I was chief of police in Los Angeles at the time. And we took a look at that, 10 different locations in that city, taken over by gunmen, and we looked at our strategies in the LAPD. We were really geared up SWAT teams to deal with an incident. But we were not at that time, geared up to deal with 10 incidents with people with assault weapons, and grenades, and, intent on just killing, and not taking hostages and negotiate, but to take hostages to prolong the event, but ultimately you're gonna kill them all.

So we effectively had to change totally the strategies of the LAPD, and that meant also equipping many more officers with assault weapons in their cars. Why? You can't expect a police officer with a nine millimeter, to go in, and you saw those scenes in Nairobi, of those incredibly courageous plainclothes officers going into that with six shot revolvers and handguns, and they were facing people with machine guns. So you have to be conscious of officer safety and training to, because they are charged with going in. And when you have a, the term that we use is a, basically the armed shooter, the active shooter.

We learned after Columbine, you can't stay outside and put your plans together because in the meantime, he's roaming around killing people. The first officer on the

scene has to get in. So what happened in the Navy yard, you had five officers from three different departments, very quickly gather. They had a couple of assault weapons with them, and they went in after him. And but for them going in, and two of them ultimately shot I think as a result of it, that they stopped him. Otherwise, he could've kept roaming around as we saw happen in Nairobi for three days, four days. So a long winded answer to that question, but there's been a growing sentiment about this idea of too many SWAT teams, and they're overused.

Well that's a matter of basically training, supervision and control, because there's no denying, unfortunately, in this country, at this time, the need. Cause if police can't take them on, are you equipped to do it? Certainly not. Should you be expected to do it? Certainly not. That's what the police are there for, that's what they're trained for. And fortunately, when stuff happens, they go toward it instead of run away from it.

PAUL: So here's another question. What can police departments do to broadly and systematically, underlined, systematically gain the trust of its civilians, especially those in the racial ethnic socioeconomic groups that feel they've been treated differently and disrespectfully?

WILLIAM: It's hard, hard, hard, hard work. And I spent seven years as the chief of Los Angeles Police Department, and while I'm most known for New York, I think my most successful time was Los Angeles. Because not only did we get crime down almost 60 percent, particularly gang crime, in one of the most gang ridden cities in America. Gang crime that is focused almost entirely in the minority, African American and Latino community. But we were able to turn around community attitudes about the Los Angeles Police Department, and the Los Angeles Police attitudes about the community.

Two entities that had been at war with each other, literally, for 50 to 60 years. '50s, '60s, '70s, '80s, '90s. You had the two urban riots to reinforce that, how much anger there was against law enforcement. That I feel quite proud of the fact that coming out of LA, a study done by Harvard University, polling done and continues to be done by the Los Angeles Times, which was never a particular friend of the LAPD. Comments by Connie Rice, the, one of the most prominent civil rights attorneys in America, the advancement project. John Mack, the head of the Urban League for 35 years and my boss at the LAPD, in charge of the police commission for five years.

The LA Times editorialized that finally, a corner has been turned on race relations, that consistently, in the minority



communities, African American, Latino, favorability of police, is at 66, 70 percent level. In a department that is very assertive in taking on crime, a very small police department, but one that has been able to do it with, in a way that while there was still understandably hostility and resentment, I'm not talking, it's not become Disneyland. But you can't do it, it takes a lot of work, I spent a lot of time in churches, and basements, and community meetings, and my captains and my lieutenants.

The whole idea, decentralization. It can be done, you can have crime reduction, assertive policing, and at the same time, improved race relations, and ethnic relations, particularly in terms of the terrorism issues.

PAUL: So just to follow up on that. Now one of the hallmarks of your, your turnaround here in New York was this reliance on data, and comstat, and reliable fast turnaround data. When you were in LA, did you have a way to get any information, any data on the public attitudes toward the police? What did you use as your proxy indicators of your...

WILLIAM: Well actually because we didn't have the money to do it other than toward the end when we were coming out of the federal consensusry [PH] that was needed to basically address a lot of the internal issues in the LAPD that were computing the effort to try and improve the relations with the minority communities. You really had to rely on polling done by entities such as the LA Times, and other institutions. Cause you didn't have the money to do it on your own. What has changed with social media, is the phenomenal ability, and that's one of the exciting things about what's going on policing today, you saw it in the Boston Marathon bombing.

That police historically have always had to rely on going through the media to get to the public. I used to be criticized that I never met a camera I didn't like. Well it's the idea that, I recognized very early on in my career, and a lot of my contemporaries did not. That to get my message out, not only to the public but to the cops, because cops read papers. They watch television, their families watch television. You needed to use the media. Media hates the term that they use, but you had to make yourself available to them, and sometimes it was painful to make yourself available to them. But you had to get out with them to get the message through them.

And often times it was filtered based on the editorial leanings of the particular newspapers, etcetera. The city's a case in point, you got the New York Post would look at

something in a very different way than Wall Street Journal and New York Times would like, or the Amsterdam News. But what we saw in Boston was that, I spent a million dollars on developing a website on the LAPD, it's one of the most transparent in the country, gives you up to the minute information on crime in your neighborhoods. It's piped directly into the LA Times as it's going out to the public. And that was the state of the art reaching the public in 2008, 2009.

But now we have Twitter. Now we have all these social media sites, I'm involved, a company I just created, creating a social media site for police. But what Ed Davis, the police commissioner in Boston did, and I remember when he was talking about Twitter in 2009 when I was still in the business. I had a hard time understanding what the hell a blog was, I finally understood the importance of web, blog was beyond me, I always thought that was some guy sitting in his underwear in the basement, typing away somewhere, so Twitter defied me, the idea of 140 characters. But Ed got it. And what he was able to do in the Boston bombing, was as the news media was erroneously reporting, CNN, New York Post puts a couple pictures of, here's the bombers. They weren't the bombers.

CNN reports, bombers arrested. They weren't arrested. Boston instantly puts out on a Twitter site to its 12,000 fans, no arrest has been made. The two individuals identified in the New York Post were not who we're looking for. That, and then that Twitter site grew to a couple hundred thousand very quickly, including all media outlets. Cause the most accurate information was coming from the police instead of law enforcement say, commissioner Ed Davis says. So you had a irrefutable source. And so the marvelous thing now, is that we still have to deal with the media, because you know, in terms of their vast reach.

But we also have, through Twitter, the ability to reach into communities in a way that we did not in the past, to communicate. To answer questions. And to get information out real time, particularly in times of crises that there's been a shooting incident, police shot an unarmed suspect. No, the suspect was armed with an AK-47 and shot two police officers, but how rumors build up and get out of control. And before the news media can report it, we can get that information out. And one of the risks of relying on the news media, is the first story is never the correct story.

It is never the correct story, that when you look at the Navy yard story, there was so much erroneous information



initially. Cause the media is under tremendous pressure to get the story out first. I never quite understood that myself, but it's always about being first. And as a result over the last several years, the sourcing that editors used to require. You need a second source, a third source. Well now the source is some guy sitting in his underwear, writing a blog. He puts it up, and mainstream media now reports that as the news. And so we're, we're now finding a way in law enforcement to effectively provide balance to the news.

But to work, you have to have the trust of the community that what you're telling them is what you know at the moment. And it's preliminary, cause it may change. And that's the most important word in policing. Particularly if you deal, frequently in front of the media. Preliminary, cause the story will change, guaranteed over time.

PAUL: Well, let me give you one last question, which is, in a sense of management question. How can somebody who manages a police force deal with a problem that a few, a few of the people working for the force can actually do a lot of harm to the legitimacy of the entire force?

WILLIAM: There was a police official in this city at one time, made a comment, something to the effect that they had 38,000 career assassins working for them. The idea being that any one of the police officers in the city of New York at anytime, through his criminal behavior, brutal behavior, inappropriate behavior, could effectively bring about catastrophic incidents. And all you have to do is think Lewima [PH], the actions of Volpie [PH] and several others that, in terms of the crises of confidence that that created in the public, particularly the minority public about how they're being treated.

Dorsman [PH], Dialo [PH]. So the idea is that the way you deal with that, is to make it clearly known that you're gonna do the best you can to train, to recruit, to supervise. To discipline when appropriate, and to at all times be honest about what you're doing, to be transparent. The, I defy you, if you Google it, you probably won't find transparency in police, those two words together 'til we were using them in 1995 when we talked about, we wanted to create a transparent organization.

And that's what the comstat process was that we developed in '94, to track our crime. Time the active intelligence, rapidly respond to what it was telling us. Effective tactics, and relentless follow-up. But to do it in an environment where all the police commanders come together to talk about what's working, what's not working, and in that

process, part of the effort was to reduce falsification, fabrication. Cause if you're in there with all your peers, they're gonna very quickly detect, uh oh. Something's wrong there that you know, the sixth instinct. Also through auditing, that if any precinct was reporting an increase of three percent or a decrease, they were audited to find out, because that was outside the variation for the rest of the department.

So it's, it all comes down to leadership, leadership that is inclusive, leadership that is collaborative. That's, collaboration, the book, I'll do a book plug here, it's the most recent one. Collaborative Parish is 25 stories from around the world that in a network world, that we all live in today, that if you're not collaborating, you're not gonna survive, and two examples. Barnes and Noble still there, struggling, but Borders is gone. Why is Borders gone? Who do you have to collaborate with as a retail store? Your customers. That's who you need to collaborate. Barnes and Noble recognized that its customers, its collaborators, were moving toward electronic media to read books.

Borders did not, so what did Barnes and Noble do? They developed, what is it, the Nook?

PAUL: Yeah.

WILLIAM: They had their version of Kindle. They're still in there, and a lot of the reason they're in there is because they're selling books through the Nook. Border went out because it lost the ability to collaborate. So police leadership needs to continually find ways to better collaborate, and in today's social media, there's so many opportunities, through the web, blogs, Twitter, social media sites, that the ability to reach out and develop relationships before something happens. Cause you need that relationship before something happens, so when it does happen, the community will give you the benefit of the doubt.

They'll have some degree of trust that you're gonna deal with it openly, transparently, and committed to right the wrong, or... You don't wanna try to establish those relationships only after the fact. It doesn't work.

PAUL: We could talk for another hour I'm sure, but we've got students who gotta get to class, and I know you've got another engagement, so please join me in thanking commissioner Bratton.